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Abstract 
This paper seeks to examine the effect of mutual fund governance on stock selection and market timing abilities. 
This paper applies a Structural Equation Modelling technique to solve the potential endogeneity problem 
between internal governance measures and stock selection and market timing. The main conclusion of this paper 
is to provide evidence through robust statistical analysis around the usefulness of governance attributes Egyptian 
mutual funds stock selection and market timing abilities. Accordingly, the financial crisis demonstrates a need to 
modify some recommendations contained in the OECD methodology for evaluating the implementation of the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. This paper find that board size and proportion of independent 
directors is negatively associated with stock selection, and proportion of directors holding zero shares is 
positively associated with stock selection. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Mutual Fund, Endogeneity. 
 
1. Introduction 
This study seeks to present a brief overview of the developments in the Egyptian mutual fund industry since the 
financial crisis of 2007, the broad developments show that while recovery in the industry post-crisis has been 
quite robust, a tendency towards risk aversion, akin to a global trend, has become visible with the mutual fund 
industry’s asset base, resource mobilization and investment in capital markets increasingly leaning towards the 
most liquid asset classes.1 
The global financial crisis has negatively been transmitted to the Egyptian economy particularly since 
mid-2008. The impact has been more pronounced on the real economy rather than the banking sector.2 This is 
due to a number of factors most prominent of which is the limited integration of the Egyptian banking sector in 
the global financial market. Moreover, the Central Bank of Egypt has succeeded in reforming the sector since 
2004 by consolidating the banks into large conglomerates; restructuring bank management; and getting rid of 
toxic debts. The Central Bank also introduces stringent rules of governance to guarantee the disciplined 
functioning of the system. Finally, the banking system has not been short of liquidity with the lending-to-deposit 
ratio not exceeding 53%, which is well within the safe boundaries compared to the rest of the world.  
The global financial crisis unsurprisingly has an impact both on the amount of savings being channelled 
into mutual funds over the world, and on the distribution of resources among mutual fund classes embodying 
varying degrees of risk. Empirical evidence from across the globe confirms that there has been a movement 
away from riskier to less risky assets during the crisis and through the recovery period (Bose, 2012). Here 
looking at the broad developments in the Egyptian mutual fund industry, the industry’s asset base is seen to be 
growing at phenomenal rates prior to the crisis; the post-crisis period provides an interesting timeframe to study 
the trends in the industry as this period is characterized by considerable variations in global and domestic 
economic and financial market conditions, as well as in policy regimes in Egypt.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of corporate governance and ownership in stock 
picking and market timing abilities. The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews the previous 
literature and empirical hypothesis on the relationship between mutual fund board structure and stock picking 
and market timing; section 3 discusses the econometric approach and data description; section 4 lays out the 
structural equation modelling analysis. Finally, section 5 presents research contributions and suggestions for 
future studies. 
                                                          
1 Samir Radwan; ILO, SRO Cairo; April 2009.  
2 Mohamed Khalifa Ibrahim; The Effect of the Economic Crisis on Egypt's Economy; November 2011. 
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2. Literature Review and the Hypotheses 
Unfortunately, most economists ignore individual feelings when analyzing financial crisis. They should take into 
account the normal thinking of individual investors, with its considerable irrational behaviors (Akerlof and 
Shiller, 2010). Overconfidence and representativeness are the main causes of psychological biases that influence 
the decision making of investors (Gilovich et al., 2002).  
Lindlof and Taylor (2010) examine the effects of the financial crisis between January 2008 and June 
2010 by Pew Research Centre with 2,967 respondents. They find that 62% of Americans reduced their spending 
since the crisis began in December 2007. Another comprehensive study of the effect of the financial crisis on 
households is a 2009 follow-up Federal Reserve Board study (Bricker et al., 2011) of families that collaborated 
in the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). They find that most families (63%) experienced losses in 
wealth. Additionally, O'Neill and Xiao (2012) examine the performance of 20 financial practices pre and post the 
financial crisis. The sample is divided into two sub periods pre- and post- December 31, 2007. After converting 
quiz items to three behavioural categories, scores for all three behaviours – budgeting, spending, and saving – 
are significantly higher after the financial crisis. 
 
2.1 Role of Board of Directors on Stock Picking and Market Timing Abilities  
Poor corporate governance has been suggested by academics as a key contributing factor to the recent crisis 
(Bebchuk et al., 2010; Blundell-Wignall et al., 2008; Cornett et al., 2010; Haspeslagh, 2010; Kirkpatrick, 2009; 
Moxey and Berendt, 2008; and Pirson and Turnbull, 201, Lewellyn and  Muller-Kahle, 2012; Muller-Kahle and 
Lewellyn, 2011). Theoretically, McNulty et al. (2013) argue for the significance of board processes and their 
impact on financial risk supported by quantitative evidence. Through attention to the deeper social-psychological 
dynamics of collective board behaviour, they are afforded greater understanding of board functions and how risk 
management operates through the mechanism of the board (Boyd et al., 2011; Golden and Zajac, 2001; Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003; Pearce and Zahra, 1991; and Zahra and Pearce, 1989). The evidence on the value of corporate 
governance during the crisis is derived from data on US financial companies (Balachandran et al., 2010; 
Bebchuk et al., 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Cornett et al., 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Hagendorff 
and Vallascas, 2011; and Tung and Wang, 2012, (Ahrens et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, McNulty et al. (2013) extend earlier work by providing evidence for UK firms. Similar to 
US firms, firms in the UK are significantly affected by the crisis and experience a considerable weakening of 
their balance sheets (Financial Times, 2008).1 Practically, in the aftermath of the crisis, emphasis is given in the 
UK to the important role of boards in managing risk. Subsequently, the UK Corporate Governance Code has 
determined the responsibility of boards for effective risk management (Financial Reporting Council, 2010: 
Principle C.2).  
 
2.2 Role of Ownership Structure on Stock Picking and Market Timing Abilities  
Desender et al. (2013) develop a contingency approach to explain how firm ownership influences the monitoring 
function of the board measured as the magnitude of external audit fees contracted by the board. Analyses of data 
on Continental European companies find that while board independence and audit services are complementary 
when ownership is dispersed, this is not the case when ownership is concentrated suggesting that ownership 
concentration and board composition become substitutes in terms of monitoring management.  
Furthermore, Erkens et al. (2012) investigate the influence of corporate governance on financial firms' 
performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, they find that firms with more independent boards and higher 
institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period. They suggest that this is 
because (1) firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which resulted in larger 
shareholder losses during the crisis period, and (2) firms with more independent boards raised more equity 
capital during the crisis which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debt holders. 
This paper examines two models proposed and tested in the literature to measure stock picking and 
market timing abilities of Egyptian fund managers which are: (1) Jensen (1968) model, and (2) Treynor and 
Mazuy (1966) model respectively. The study of the impact of corporate governance on portfolio selection and 
market timing is particularly valuable for various reasons (Lassoued and Elmir, 2012). Firstly, a large body of 
theoretical and empirical literature has shown that corporate governance mechanisms affect risk and return. In 
fact, many arguments demonstrate that board characteristics (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; and Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein, 2007), ownership structure (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; and Holmström and Tirole, 1993), 
managerial compensation (Berger et al., 1997; and Cohen et al., 2002) and external control (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983; and Gompers et al., 2003) help to explain risk and return. Secondly, governance quality seems to be a 
criterion used by sophisticated investors for their portfolio management (Cremers and Nair, 2005; Hooper et al., 
2008; Leuz et al., 2010; Lassoued, 2010; Bushee et al., 2013).  
                                                          
 1 See “Analysts Hit the Books to Judge the Impact of Credit Crunch,” Financial Times, August 6, 2008. 
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Consequently, when this research investigates the role of corporate governance mechanisms on stock 
picking and market timing abilities, endogeneity come from the powerful association between past values of the 
regressand (stock picking and market timing), and current values of the regressors (corporate governance 
structure) (Wintoki et al., 2012; Chandio, 2011; Klein & Zur, 2011; Westland, 2010; Hair et al., 2006).  There 
are many methods of overcoming this; including Maximum likelihood (ML) and Ggeneralized Method of 
Moments (GMM). Although, GMM and ML is a general framework for deriving estimators, there is a difference 
between the assumptions of the two methods. ML estimators use assumptions about the specific families of 
distributions for the random variables to derive an objective function.  It selects the parameters that are probably 
have generated the observed data, which can be proceeded by maximizing an objective function. GMM 
estimators use assumptions about the moments of the random variables to derive an objective function. The 
assumed moments of the random variables present population moment conditions, which can be achieved by 
minimizing an objective function. Accordingly, ML can be more efficient than GMM, because ML uses the 
entire distribution instead of uses specified moments only (Breitung and Lechner, 1995). 
Therefore, this paper utilizes SEM which is a multivariate technique that allows us to estimate a system 
of equations. Structural Equation Models are often drawn as Path Diagrams. SEM is a Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML), which estimates all the equations and all the unknown parameters jointly and 
obtains robust findings, compared with GMM. Therefore, this study uses different independent variables to 
characterize the structure of the board as illustrated below: 
Board size: as the most critical corporate governance mechanism, boards of directors play an important 
role in setting the strategic direction of an organization (Braun and Latham, 2007). Yet, no clear finding emerges 
from the literature regarding the effects of board size. One meta-analysis finds a positive relationship between 
board size and improves financial performance (Dalton et al., 1999), while other researchers cast doubt on this 
relationship (e.g., Bhagat and Black, 1999). 
Golden and Zajac (2001) suggest that small boards might better facilitate strategic change. Although 
there is an evidence to the contrary (Boyd, 1990), it suggests that large boards are generally viewed as 
possessing a depth of expertise on which to draw strategic guidance. Directors bring benefits to the organization 
including information, access to channels, access to resources, and legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Furthermore, resource dependence theory suggests that larger boards help to better link an organization with its 
environment to minimize environmental dependence, (Hillman et al., 2009). Therefore, they are associated with 
a firm’s ability to obtain external financing particularly in times of resource scarcity (Valenti and Schneider, 
2014). 
Accordingly, it is reasoned that while good governance board characteristics including large board size, 
associated with vigilant oversight may represent best practice in stable state conditions, these same 
characteristics can inhibit managerial discretion and limit their capacity to respond to the contingencies of a 
financial crisis with harmful effects for a firm’s financial performance (Essen et al., 2013). In the context of the 
crisis, it is expected to be a performance disadvantage in firms that have vigilant boards (those characterized by 
larger boards).  
H1: Vigilant boards characterized by larger boards have a negative impact on stock picking and market timing 
abilities of the Egyptian mutual fund managers during a financial crisis. 
Proportion of independent directors and inside directors: Board composition has long been viewed as an 
important determinant of board effectiveness (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). Research has largely focused on 
whether outsider - or insider - dominated boards have a greater influence on corporate strategy, with somewhat 
mixed results (Johnson et al., 1996). Firms whose boards are comprised of mostly outsiders have been found to 
be more likely to initiate strategic changes such as corporate restructuring. An alternative perspective suggests 
that inside directors might provide better strategic direction than outsiders, given their understanding of their 
firm’s operations, customers, and business model (Bruni-Bossio and Sheehan, 2013). In addition, their inside 
information can enhance top management commitment to pursue more risky, yet potentially profitable 
investments (Baysinger et al., 1991). Further, given the scarcity of credit in the years immediately following the 
crisis, the influence of inside directors to initiate strategic changes might have become more pronounced (Valenti 
and Schneider, 2014, Anderson et al., 2004).   
During the crisis period, transparent reporting implies the timely recognition of losses related to 
subprime mortgages (Erkens et al., 2012). Because the recognition of losses led to lower capital adequacy ratios, 
firms have to resort to raising equity capital to avoid regulatory intervention. Raising equity capital, however, is 
very costly; it could have led to worse stock returns during the crisis because it causes a wealth transfer from 
existing equity holders to debt holders (Myers, 1977). Similarly, Aggarwal et al. (2007) contend that boards 
comprising a high ratio of independent directors have an information disadvantage compared with insiders and 
are typically slow to react in situations of adversity.  
H2: Vigilant boards comprising a high proportion of independent directors have a negative impact on stock 
picking and market timing abilities of the Egyptian mutual fund managers during a financial crisis. 
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As indicated before, proportion of independent directors is negatively associated with fund performance 
during the crisis. Therefore, lower performance might lead to decreasing the level of corporate governance index.  
H3: Vigilant boards comprising a high proportion of independent directors have a negative impact on corporate 
governance index of the fund management company during a financial crisis. 
Director’s background: Grace et al. (1995) find that there is no association between board composition 
which consists of a majority of non-executive directors and performance. Similarly, Gottesman and Morey (2010) 
argue that there is no significant correlation between the education of the CEO and performance. On the contrary, 
Brickley et al. (1994) find the results of their study to be driven by the proportion of professional independent 
directors. They find professional directors having the greatest positive coefficient (0. 085) of the four types, and 
the only one that is individually significant.  
H4: There is a positive relation between proportion of professional directors on the board and stock picking and 
market timing abilities of the Egyptian mutual fund managers during the financial crisis. 
As indicated before, the proportion of professional directors is positively associated with fund performance 
during the crisis. Therefore, higher performance might lead to increasing the level of corporate governance index.  
H5: There is a positive relation between the proportion of professional directors on the board and corporate 
governance index of the fund management company during the financial crisis. 
Board committee structure: in the steady state, board vigilance serves to mitigate the agency costs 
resulting from the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As indicated before, 
characteristic good governance prescriptions regarding vigilance include the independence of directors (Essen et 
al., 2012), large board size, frequent board meetings (Grove et al., 2011), and an active array of specialized 
committees. For instance, Bruno and Claessens (2010) find that the presence and independence of four 
functional committees (audit, nomination, compensation, and governance) have a positive impact on firm value. 
Although the value of vigilant board oversight and the managerial discretion literature suggest that 
excessive monitoring and frequent interference in a firm’s affairs may discourage managerial initiatives and 
harm firm value, similarly in the context of the crisis, there might be corporate governance disadvantages in 
firms that have vigilant boards (those characterized by presence of functional committees) (Essen et al., 2013).  
H6: Vigilant boards comprising a high proportion of directors in the investment committee have a negative 
impact on corporate governance index of the fund management company during the financial crisis. 
Equity ownership by directors: Mehran (1995) argues that that there is a positive correlation between 
the proportion of equity held by managers and firm performance. Similarly, this variable is included to examine 
if equity ownership by directors supports their fulfillment of shareholder interests, equity ownership by each 
director is reported within one of five EGP ranges. Similar to Ferris and Yan (2007), the proportion of directors 
holding zero shares is used as the measure of equity ownership by directors rather than the proportion of 
directors holding more than EGP 100,000 (or any other EGP range) because holding zero shares of the funds are 
strongly revealing of the absence of any incentive for the fund directors. 
Erkens et al. (2012) include the percentage of shares held by insiders to control for ownership 
characteristics that are potentially correlated with the level of institutional ownership and the presence of large 
shareholders. Their conclusion on the relation between crisis-period performance and corporate governance is 
not sensitive to controlling for ownership characteristics. In the normal circumstances, institutional shareholders 
will seek maximizing returns from their equity stake, and while they will closely monitor the returns, they will 
avoid active involvement in firms whose shares they hold. On the other hand, in the context of a crisis, 
institutional investors are known for pulling out of a stock very quickly if they are unhappy with the returns. 
Therefore, transactional investors are likely to seek liquidity and reallocate capital during the crisis (Park and 
Song, 2001).  
H7: The proportion of directors holding zero shares has a positive impact on stock picking and market timing 
abilities of the Egyptian mutual fund managers during the financial crisis. 
As indicated before, the proportion of directors holding zero shares is positively associated with fund 
performance during the crisis.  
H8: The proportion of directors holding zero shares has a positive impact on corporate governance index of the 
fund management company during the financial crisis. 
Number of funds overseen by the fund management company: similar to Ferris and Yan (2007), this 
variable is included in the regression which is motivated by the busyness hypothesis of Ferris et al. (2003). They 
show that there is no significant evidence that multiple board memberships harm firm value. In this analysis, this 
variable allows to investigate if the fund management company with multiple funds to monitor is either too busy 
to provide effective oversight or possessing prominent expertise as a director. Similarly, it is found that the fund 
management company with multiple boards provides prominent expertise as a director which might lead to 
increasing the level of corporate governance index.  
H9: The number of funds overseen by the fund management company has a positive impact on corporate 
governance index of the fund management company during the financial crisis. 
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Director’s tenure: Walters et al. (2007) find that there is a positive correlation between CEO tenure and 
performance at low to moderate levels of tenure, in the absence of a vigilant board. 
Although there are very rare researches on the relation between director’s tenure and fund performance 
during the financial crisis, this study believes it is an important factor, and it should have been examined. 
Furthermore, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) indicate that managerial team tenure has a profound influence on 
organizational outcomes such as strategic persistence, strategic conformity, and performance conformity. On the 
contrary, Del Guercio et al. (2003) note directors who are long-serving can lose their capability to stay 
independent and become less effective as representatives for the shareholder interests. Similar to them, it is 
suggested that the average tenure of directors has a negative impact on performance. As illustrated before, the 
proportion of directors holding zero shares is positively associated with performance because investors are likely 
to seek liquidity and reallocate capital during the crisis. Accordingly, the average tenure of directors has a 
negative impact on the proportion of directors holding zero shares during the crisis.  
H10: There is a negative relation between the average tenure of directors and the proportion of directors holding 
zero shares during the crisis. 
Corporate governance index: the international corporate governance literature demonstrates that an 
external governance mechanism is an important measure of corporate governance used to protect shareholder 
interests (López de Silanes et al., 1998). Similar to Erkens et al. (2012), the influence of corporate governance is 
explored on firm performance. This paper constructs a governance index using the annual reports of the 
companies and the companies' websites, based on the OECD Corporate Governance Principles April 2004 
(EFSA). Similar to, Erkens et al. (2012) find that powerful mutual fund governance is positively correlated to 
mutual fund performance.  
H11: There is a positive relation between the corporate governance index of the fund Management Company and 
stock picking and market timing abilities of the Egyptian mutual fund managers during a financial crisis. 
In addition to the board structure variables that are discussed in this section, control variables which 
might influence fund performance are included in the regression analysis. The following discussion contains a 
brief description of control variables. 
Time: the period of the study is the years (2004-2007) and (2009-2013) - due to data availability - that 
can affect the performance of the fund. Jones (2007) suggests that investors who wish to maximize return should 
start their search by looking for younger funds. Furthermore, Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) find powerful 
evidence of out-performance during the first two to three years of fund presence. Each additional year of age 
reduces performance by 42 basis points. Similar to Aggarwal and Jorion (2010), performance measurement 
needs to control for the usual biases afflicting mutual fund databases. This bias is controlled by using Time to 
investigate how mutual funds perform over time and what role time plays in performance. Based upon the 
previous discussion, there is a negative relation between the fund age – which increases over time –and fund 
performance. Accordingly, there is a negative relation between the time and fund performance.  
Investment objective dummy variables: the type of investment objective a fund adopts affects the 
portfolio risk and return. Similar to Ferris and Yan (2007) and Tufano and Sevick (1997), a series of dummy 
variables is included to describe the investment objectives represented in the sample to take a value of 1 if the 
fund belongs to the same category under study and zero otherwise. The investment objectives represented in the 
sample are: Fund Obj1: Equity Fund, Fund Obj2: Balanced Fund, Fund Obj3: Islamic Fund Obj 4: Money 
Market Fund, and Fund Obj5: Others (Capital Guaranteed Fund, Asset Allocator Fund, Open End Income Mixed 
Fund, and Closed End Fund). 
Standard deviation of the stock return: Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) include standard deviation of the 
mutual fund return in their analysis as one of the indicators of the cost arises from holding undiversified portfolio, 
and they find a negative association between the standard deviation of the stock return and the percentage of 
shares owned by directors. Similar to them, the standard deviation of the mutual fund return is included in model 
(B) only to control for the total risk because Perf2 (γ) which examines market timing is not a risk adjusted 
measure like Perf1 (α) which examines stock picking ability of the fund manager to avoid the unique risk of 
individual assets which is part of the total risk. 
Financial crisis dummy variable: similar to Kaushik and Pennathur (2012) and Elmesseary (2014), a 
dummy variable  Dum	
 is created to take a value of zero if the period is between January 2004 and 
December 2007, and one if the period is between January 2009 and December 2013. It is noted that the credit 
crunch did not really begin until the second wave which started in July 2007 (Ryan, 2008). Thus, the full model 
regression is run after using January 2008 as the start of the crisis period across two sub-periods: ‘the Pre-Crisis 
period’ and covers the four years of (2004-2007) and ‘the Post-Crisis period’ which covers the five years of 
(2009-2013). Finally, Table (1) summarizes the key studies in the previous literature that investigate the effect of 
board structure on stock picking and market timing. 
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Table 1. Empirical Analysis on the Effect of Board Structure on Stock Picking and Market Timing 
Paper Sample Period Performance Measure Methodology Relationship 
Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) 
1,556 2003–
2008 
ROA OLS  Positive 
Nguyen et al. 
(2015) 
2,035 2006–
2008 
Q, Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model 
OLS 
 
Positive 
Essen et al. (2013) 1,197 2005–
2008 
 
Cumulative stock 
return, abnormal 
return 
OLS, HLM 
Analyses 
 
Negative  
 
Renders and 
Gaeremynck 
(2012) 
300 1999–
2003         
Q 3SLS Positive 
 
Dowell et al. 
(2011) 
227 2000–
2002 
Cash flow OLS Depends on firm and 
environmental context                                                  
Erkens et al. (2012) 296 2007–
2008 
Stock return, 
accounting writedown 
OLS Negative  
Lassoued and Elmir 
(2012) 
460 1995–
2004 
Optimal portfolio 
return 
OLS Positive  
Cave et al. (2012) 259 2006-
2008 
Treynor and Mazuy 
(1966) 
OLS Positive 
McNulty et al. 
(2013) 
141 2008–
2009 
Financial slack, net 
cash  
OLS Positive 
 
3. The Data 
In this paper the sample for the study has been restricted to funds that their life-time exceeds six years (2008-
2013) by the end of December 2013 in order to keep the funds that witnessed the FC using January 2008 as the 
start of the crisis period; this results in 35 diversified funds divided into two groups: by employing two market 
indexes (Jensen's alpha, and Treynor and Mazuy model) across two sub-periods: ‘the Pre-Crisis period’ and 
covers the four years of (2004-2007) and ‘the Post-Crisis period’ which covers the five years of (2009-2013). 
The sample is free from survivorship bias, since the sample includes both surviving and dead funds.  
This paper uses secondary data only which is collected from the most recent available data from the 
Egyptian Stock Market, Central Bank of Egypt, EIMA, World Bank, EFSA, Misr for Central Clearing, 
Depository and Registry (MCDR), and National Bank of Egypt. The data is a panel data that tracks the 
performance of several mutual funds at several points in time 2004-2013.  
The empirical analysis is carried out at different levels: (1) Jensen’s Alpha model to measure to 
measure stock selection, and (2) Treynor and Mazuy (1966) to measure market timing. See, Table 2 providing a 
full set of variables of the study (Huber & Mellace, 2013). The results are based on a sample of 524 annual and 
semi-annual observations for 35 mutual funds from 2004 to 2013. See, Table 3 which includes three panels. 
Table 2: Summary of Endogenous, Exogenous and Control Variables  
Panel (A) Endogenous Variables 
Variables Measures Source 
Mutual funds financial 
performance	
 
       	     
 
       	     	  
^
  
Calculated from mutual fund's 
prospectuses, mutual fund's 
financial statements, and 
economic review of Central 
Bank of Egypt. 
  and   calculated using OLS 
regression. 
Corporate governance 
index	 !"
 
A constructed governance index calculated as an 
average of six governance indicators: (1) Effective 
Corporate Governance Framework (2) The rights of 
shareholders (3) The equitable treatment of 
shareholders (4) The role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance (5) Disclosure and 
transparency (6) The responsibilities of the board. 
Calculated from the annual 
reports of the fund 
management companies and 
the companies' websites. 
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Panel (B) Exogenous Variables 
Variables Measures Source 
Board size	#$%&
 The size of the board. Board of director's annual 
reports of Egyptian mutual 
funds. 
Proportion of 
independent 
directors	'()	*+
   
The number of independent directors on the board 
divided by board size. 
Board of director's annual 
reports of Egyptian mutual 
funds. 
Director’s background 
(F+(	*+
 
 
(-	*+
 
The directors' background. 
The number of directors with a background in 
finance or investment divided by board size. 
The number of directors who are retired or serve on 
several different boards as professional directors 
divided by board size. 
Board of director's annual 
reports of Egyptian funds. 
Board committee 
structure  
'(.	 -//
 
01)	 -//
 
 
 
The number of directors on the investment 
committee divided by board size.    
The number of directors on the audit committee 
divided by board size.    
Board of director's annual 
reports of Egyptian mutual 
funds. 
 
Number of funds 
overseen by the fund 
management 
company	*+	23
 
The number of funds overseen by the fund 
management company. 
 
Board of director's annual 
reports of Egyptian mutual 
funds. 
Director’s 
tenure	*+	53
 
The average number of years the firm’s directors 
have served on the board either the fund management 
company board or any other boards. 
Board of director's annual 
reports of Egyptian mutual 
funds. 
 
Panel (C) Control Variables 
Time	6+/
 The years (2004 – 2007), and (2009-2013) due to 
data availability. 
Sample Period. 
Investment objective 
dummy variables	 
71()	89: 
This study uses dummy variables for the 
investment objectives represented in the sample to 
take a value of 1 if the fund belongs to the same 
category under study and zero otherwise. 
Mutual fund prospectuses. 
Standard Deviation of the 
Stock Return	;
 
The standard deviation of mutual fund returns. Calculated with help of 
Microsoft Excel. 
Financial Crisis dummy 
variable	*1/<
 
This study uses a dummy variable to take a value 
of zero if the period is between January 2004 and 
December 2007 and one if the period is between 
January 2009 and December 2013. 
Sample Period. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Board Structure and Fund Performance 
Panel A: Fund and Governance Descriptive Statistics 
Model A 
                     Number of obs =    524 
Model B 
Number of obs =    524 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Perf1 0.0018 0.0022 -0.0030 0.0120 
Perf2 -0.7491 1.6523 -10.6490 2.0760 
CGQ 0.5929 0.1686 0.3333 0.8333 0.5929 0.1686 0.3333 0.8333 
DirOwn 0.8489 0.2356 0.0000 1.0000 0.8489 0.2356 0.0000 1.0000 
Time 2008.00 2.8710 2004.00 2013.00 2008.00 2.8710 2004.00 2013.00 
Dump 0.5134 0.5003 0.0000 1.0000 0.5134 0.5003 0.0000 1.0000 
Dumfc 0.6107 0.4881 0.0000 1.0000 0.6107 0.4881 0.0000 1.0000 
FundObj1 0.4466 0.4976 0.0000 1.0000 0.4466 0.4976 0.0000 1.0000 
FundObj2 0.1412 0.3486 0.0000 1.0000 0.1412 0.3486 0.0000 1.0000 
FundObj3 0.0992 0.2993 0.0000 1.0000 0.0992 0.2993 0.0000 1.0000 
FundObj4 0.1508 0.3582 0.0000 1.0000 0.1508 0.3582 0.0000 1.0000 
DirTn 19.8817 6.2022 6.0000 29.0000 19.8817 6.2022 6.0000 29.0000 
DirFn 10.3092 5.0440 1.0000 15.0000 10.3092 5.0440 1.0000 15.0000 
AudComm 0.2771 0.1112 0.0909 0.4286 0.2771 0.1112 0.0909 0.4286 
InvComm 0.1684 0.1170 0.0833 0.5455 0.1684 0.1170 0.0833 0.5455 
ProfDir 0.4152 0.3176 0.0909 1.0000 0.4152 0.3176 0.0909 1.0000 
FinDir 0.3412 0.2218 0.0909 0.8000 0.3412 0.2218 0.0909 0.8000 
BSize 9.3989 3.0888 3.0000 16.0000 9.3989 3.0888 3.0000 16.0000 
IndDir 0.8165 0.2362 0.0000 1.0000 0.8165 0.2362 0.0000 1.0000 
StdDev i 0.0204 0.0134 0.0001 0.0602 
 
Panel B: Pearson Correlations (Model A) 
Variable Time Dump Perf1 BSize IndDir AudComm InvComm DirOwn DirFn DirTn FinDir ProfDir CGQ 
Time 1.0000 
Dump 0.0342 1.0000 
Perf1 -0.5360 -0.0492 1.0000 
BSize -0.0816 -0.0103 0.1178 1.0000 
IndDir 0.1911 0.0119 0.0144 0.2069 1.0000 
AudComm 0.0658 -0.0122 0.1347 -0.2219 -0.0196 1.0000 
InvComm -0.1344 0.0125 -0.1060 -0.0602 -0.3173 -0.4502 1.0000 
DirOwn 0.0667 -0.0029 0.0912 0.6869 0.6893 -0.2432 -0.0984 1.0000 
DirFn 0.0959 -0.0062 0.1606 0.2286 0.4722 0.6850 -0.6540 0.2944 1.0000 
DirTn -0.0603 -0.0186 0.1496 0.5535 0.0743 -0.2392 -0.1463 0.3105 0.2017 1.0000 
FinDir -0.0609 -0.0004 0.0876 0.4899 -0.0726 -0.1785 -0.1391 0.0625 -0.0320 0.4064 1.0000 
ProfDir -0.0224 0.0037 0.0991 0.4874 0.0780 -0.0458 -0.2230 0.1079 0.1365 0.3690 0.9751 1.0000 
CGQ 0.1047 0.0042 0.1193 0.3681 0.2932 0.6009 -0.4807 0.2694 0.6789 -0.0468 0.4297 0.5680 1.0000 
 
Panel C: Pearson Correlations (Model B) 
Time Dump Perf2 
StdDev 
i BSize IndDir 
AudCom
m 
InvCom
m 
DirOw
n DirFn DirTn 
FinDi
r 
ProfDi
r CGQ 
Time 1.0000 
Dump 0.0342 1.0000 
Perf2 0.2995 0.1430 1.0000 
StdDev i 
-
0.0002 
-
0.0964 0.0489 1.0000 
BSize 
-
0.0816 
-
0.0103 
-
0.0911 0.1477 1.0000 
IndDir 0.1911 0.0119 0.0365 0.1461 0.2069 1.0000 
AudCom
m 0.0658 
-
0.0122 
-
0.0392 0.3040 
-
0.2219 
-
0.0196 1.0000 
InvComm 
-
0.1344 0.0125 0.0566 -0.3502 
-
0.0602 
-
0.3173 -0.4502 1.0000 
DirOwn 0.0667 
-
0.0029 
-
0.0525 0.1835 0.6869 0.6893 -0.2432 -0.0984 1.0000 
DirFn 0.0959 
-
0.0062 
-
0.0628 0.3720 0.2286 0.4722 0.6850 -0.654 0.2944 1.0000 
DirTn 
-
0.0603 
-
0.0186 
-
0.1100 0.0832 0.5535 0.0743 -0.2392 -0.1463 0.3105 0.2017 1.0000 
FinDir 
-
0.0609 
-
0.0004 
-
0.0466 -0.0515 0.4899 
-
0.0726 -0.1785 -0.1391 0.0625 
-
0.0320 0.4064 1.0000 
ProfDir 
-
0.0224 0.0037 
-
0.0375 -0.0051 0.4874 0.0780 -0.0458 -0.2230 0.1079 0.1365 0.3690 0.9751 1.0000 
CGQ 0.1047 0.0042 
-
0.0347 0.2774 0.3681 0.2932 0.6009 -0.4807 0.2694 0.6789 
-
0.0468 0.4297 0.568 
1.000
0 
Panel A provides main fund and governance statistics for the overall sample. Included are the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the variables used in the analysis for the two models (A), and 
(B). Perf1, and Perf2, for the overall sample, have mean values of, 0.18%, and -74%, respectively. Their mean 
values, however, vary somewhat more with Perf2 having lower mean value than Perf1 (about 74.18%). These 
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differences in the mean values are driven by the divergence between Perf1 (alpha, which represents a measure of 
stock picking ability of the fund manager), and Perf2 (gamma, which denotes the presence of market-timing 
ability). For the overall sample, all variables used in the analysis except (Perf1, and Perf2) for the two models 
(A), and (B) have similar mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values. 
For the overall sample, on average, the board structure is comprised of nine directors, and about 81% of 
them are independent directors. The board composition, on average, consists of 27% of directors on the audit 
committee, and 16% of directors on the investment committee. The board of directors, on average, includes 34% 
financial directors, and 41% professional directors. The average tenure of directors is 19 years. In terms of 
director ownership, about 84% of directors hold zero shares. Furthermore, the corporate governance index, on 
average, is 59%. The number of funds overseen by the fund management company, on average, is ten mutual 
funds per company.  Furthermore, the major funds in the sample belong to open end equity fund. 
Panel B provides the correlations between all variables included in model (A).  Perf1 is positively 
correlated with BSize, IndDir, AudComm, DirOwn, DirFn, DirTn, FinDir, ProfDir, and CGQ and negatively 
correlated with InvComm. BSize exhibits the same pattern and is positively correlated with IndDir, DirOwn, 
DirFn, DirTn, FinDir, ProfDir, and CGQ and negatively correlated with InvComm. IndDir exhibits the same 
pattern and is positively correlated with DirOwn, DirFn, DirTn, ProfDir, and CGQ and negatively correlated 
with InvComm. AudComm exhibits the same pattern and is positively correlated with DirFn and CGQ and 
negatively correlated with InvComm. DirOwn exhibits the same pattern and is positively correlated with DirFn, 
DirTn, FinDir, ProfDir, and CGQ. DirFn exhibits the same pattern and is positively correlated with DirTn, Prof 
Dir, and CGQ. DirTn exhibits the same pattern and is positively correlated with FinDir, and ProfDir. FinDir 
exhibits the same pattern and is positively correlated with ProfDir, and CGQ. Finally, ProfDir exhibits the same 
pattern and is positively correlated with CGQ. 
Interestingly, the correlations for Perf1, BSize, and IndDir are positive for DirOwn suggesting that 
vigilant boards are associated with a high fraction of directors holding zero shares. Furthermore, the correlations 
for BSize, IndDir, AudComm, DirOwn, DirFn, FinDir, and ProfDir are positive for Perf1, and CGQ suggesting 
that vigilant boards are associated with a higher performance, and a higher corporate governance index.  
Panel C provides the correlations between all variables included in model (B). Perf2 is positively 
correlated with StdDev i, IndDir, and InvComm, and negatively correlated with Bsize, AudComm, DirOwn, 
DirFn, DirTn, FinDir, ProfDir, and CGQ. StdDev i exhibits the same pattern and is positively correlated with 
IndDir, and negatively correlated with FinDir, and ProfDir. Bsize exhibits the same pattern and is positively 
correlated with IndDir and negatively correlated with AudComm. IndDir exhibits the same pattern and is 
negatively correlated with AudComm, FinDir. AudComm exhibits the same pattern and is negatively correlated 
with DirOwn, DirTn, FinDir, and ProfDir. InvComm exhibits the same pattern and is negatively correlated with 
DirOwn, DirFn, DirTn, FinDir, ProfDir, and CGQ. DirFn exhibits the same pattern and is negatively correlated 
with FinDir. Finally, DirTn exhibits the same pattern and is negatively correlated with CGQ.  
As indicated before in model (A), the correlations for BSize and IndDir are positive for DirOwn 
suggesting that vigilant boards (those characterized by a high fraction of independent directors, and the presence 
and independence of functional committees) are associated with a high fraction of directors holding zero shares. 
Furthermore, the correlations for BSize, IndDir, AudComm, DirOwn, DirFn, FinDir, and ProfDir are positive for 
CGQ suggesting that vigilant boards are associated with a higher corporate governance index. Additionally, the 
correlations for IndDir and InvComm are positive for Perf2 suggesting that vigilant boards are associated with a 
higher performance. 
Overall, the results of the descriptive statistics are consistent with agency theory (e.g., Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990), and the law and finance (e.g., López de Silanes et al., 1998) literatures suggest that firm good 
governance characteristics, including an independent and vigilant board, will enhance corporate value and firm 
performance (Essen et al., 2013). 
Similar to (Ferris and Yan, 2009) and (Essen et al., 2013), it is suggested that there is potential 
endogeneity between internal governance measures and financial risk management – measured by stock 
selection and market timing abilities of the fund managers – during the financial crisis because the prior board 
structure may affect current performance. Therefore, this potential endogeneity is examined in a structural 
equation model below. 
 
4. Structural Equation Modelling Analysis 
SEM is adapted from (Erkens et al., 2012), (Adams, 2012) and (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). To test the effect 
of board composition on mutual fund performance, this study uses the SEM technique through the following 
three stages: model specification, model estimation, and goodness of fit indices, which will be discussed 
respectively in the ensuing sections. 
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4.1 Structural Model Specification   
For the analysis of the effect of board structure on mutual fund performance, this study evaluates the previous 
hypotheses. To test this assertion, a simultaneous equation system is utilized, where fund performance, corporate 
governance index, and director ownership are endogenous variables by using the following structural equation 
model: 
	PerfA  	αA  	αB	BDEF
  	α	IndJK
 	αL	FinJK
  αN	ProfJK
  	αP	DirQR

 	αS	CGV
  	αW	DirXYR
  	αZ	Inv\]^^
 	α_Aud\]^^
  αBa	DirbR

 	αBB	σᵢ	
  αB	Time
  αBL	Dumf
 αBNFundXghB
 αBP	FundXghαBS	FundXghL  αBW	FundXghNαBZ	Dum	

	 ɛ	A							 
                                                                                    (1) 
	CGV  	βA  		βB	BDEF
  		β	IndJK
 	βL	FinJK
  βN	ProfJK
  	βPDirQR

 	βS	DirXYR
  βW	Inv\]^^

	βZAud\]^^
	β_	DirbR
	  βBaFundXghB
 βBB	FundXghβB	FundXghL  βBL	FundXghNβBN	Dum	
 	 ɛA 
                                                                                    (2) 
DirXYR  	γA		γB	BDEF
  		γ	IndJK
 	γL	FinJK
  γN	ProfJK
  γPDirQR

 γS	DirbR
	  γWInv\]^^
  γZAud\]^^
  γ_FundXghB
 γBa	FundXghγBB	FundXghL  γB	FundXghNγBL	Dum	
 	 ɛA 
                                                                                    (3) 
 
4.2 The Estimation Results 
The results about the estimation of the structural model (A), (B) are presented in Table (4) which includes three 
panels for every model. The path diagram for the two models (A), and (B) is presented in Figure (1) and (2) 
respectively According to the previous, in testing the hypotheses, results reveal that there are eleven hypotheses 
in this study, and ten hypotheses i.e. H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6, H7, H8, H9, and H10 are statistically significant. 
Thus, these hypotheses are supported. While, one hypothesis i.e. H11 is found statistically not significant. Hence, 
this hypothesis is not supported. 
Although the hypothesis is not supported, the result is consistent with Ebaid (2011) argument that the 
internal audit function in Egypt suffers from many weaknesses that affect negatively its effective role in 
corporate governance. Accordingly, corporate governance in Egypt, in its current status, has no significant effect 
on performance because corporate governance rules included in the Egypt Code of Corporate Governance: 
Guidelines and Standards are not mandatory and lack legislative force (Sharma et al., 2008). Additionally, the 
result is consistent with Erkens et al. (2012) argument that the coefficients of the country-level governance 
variables are insignificant.  
Table 4. Path Coefficients - Whole Sample (p value of the t tests in parentheses) 
 Model (A) Model (B)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Panel A: The Effect of Board Structure on Mutual Fund Performance 
Perf 
CGQ -0.0020 (0.294) -1.0160 (0.512) 
Dir Own 0.0059*** (0.001) -0.3951 (0.782) 
Time -0.0004*** (0.000) -0.1542*** (0.001) 
Dump -0.0001 (0.652) 0.5075*** (0.000) 
Dumfc 0.0001 (0.779) 2.1023*** (0.000) 
Fund Obj1 0.0008* (0.019) -1.1125*** (0.000) 
Fund Obj2 -0.0001 (0.899) -0.4250 (0.224) 
Fund Obj3 0.0004 (0.339) -1.0893** (0.002) 
Aud Comm 0.0001 (0.980) 1.1127 (0.544) 
Inv Comm -0.0002 (0.878) -0.8483 (0.417) 
B Size -0.0003*** (0.000) 0.0669 (0.341) 
Ind Dir -0.0049** (0.008) 0.6582 (0.663) 
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Dir Tn 0.0000 (0.182) -0.0058 (0.825) 
Dir Fn 0.0000 (0.975) -0.0782 (0.073) 
Fin Dir -0.0183* (0.020) -2.4791 (0.701) 
Prof Dir 0.0144** (0.010) 1.9437 (0.671) 
Fund Obj4 -0.0014*** (0.001) 1.1185** (0.002) 
StdDev i 52.5244*** (0.000) 
Constant 0.8764*** (0.000) 307.5198*** (0.001) 
Panel B: The Effect of Board Structure on Corporate Governance Index 
CGQ 
Dir Own 0.2890*** (0.000) 0.2890*** (0.000) 
Dumfc 0.0109** (0.002) 0.0109** (0.002) 
Fund Obj1 0.0633*** (0.000) 0.0633*** (0.000) 
Fund Obj2 0.0495*** (0.000) 0.0495*** (0.000) 
Fund Obj3 0.0819*** (0.000) 0.0819*** (0.000) 
Aud Comm 0.5766*** (0.000) 0.5766*** (0.000) 
Inv Comm -0.1399*** (0.000) -0.1399*** (0.000) 
B Size 0.0033 (0.099) 0.0033 (0.099) 
Ind Dir -0.2194*** (0.000) -0.2194*** (0.000) 
Dir Tn -0.0114*** (0.000) -0.0114*** (0.000) 
Dir Fn 0.0079*** (0.000) 0.0079*** (0.000) 
Fin Dir -0.4345* (0.016) -0.4345* (0.016) 
Prof Dir 0.6271*** (0.000) 0.6271*** (0.000) 
Fund Obj4 0.0825*** (0.000) 0.0825*** (0.000) 
Constant 0.3309*** (0.000) 0.3309*** (0.000) 
Panel C: The Effect of Board Structure on Director Ownership 
Dir Own 
Dumfc 0.0033 (0.421) 0.0033 (0.421) 
Fund Obj1 0.1110*** (0.000) 0.1110*** (0.000) 
Fund Obj2 0.1815*** (0.000) 0.1815*** (0.000) 
Fund Obj3 0.1062*** (0.000) 0.1062*** (0.000) 
Aud Comm 0.5234*** (0.000) 0.5234*** (0.000) 
Inv Comm 0.3174*** (0.000) 0.3174*** (0.000) 
B Size 0.0462*** (0.000) 0.0462*** (0.000) 
Ind Dir 0.9846*** (0.000) 0.9846*** (0.000) 
Dir Tn -0.0087*** (0.000) -0.0087*** (0.000) 
Dir Fn 0.0126*** (0.000) 0.0126*** (0.000) 
Fin Dir 3.7165*** (0.000) 3.7165*** (0.000) 
Prof Dir -2.6595*** (0.000) -2.6595*** (0.000) 
Fund Obj4 0.1192*** (0.000) 0.1192*** (0.000) 
Constant -0.8138*** (0.000) -0.8138*** (0.000) 
var(e.Perf1) 
Constant 0.0000*** (0.000) 
var(e.CGQ) 
Constant 0.0014*** (0.000) 0.0014*** (0.000) 
var(e.DirOwn) 
Constant 0.0019*** (0.000) 0.0019*** (0.000) 
var(e.Perf2) 
Constant 1.8104*** (0.000) 
Observations 524 524 
Note: This table provides results from SEM of the effect of board structure on performance pre and post the 
financial crisis for the sample of 35 funds from (2004-2007) and (2009-2013). A robust t-statistics test is 
conducted, and p-values are in parentheses. Columns (2) and (4) provide p-values. Columns (1) and (3) present 
the path coefficients for the two models. * Statistical significance at 10% level. ** Statistical significance at 5% 
level. *** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
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Figure 1. Path Diagram - Whole Sample - for Structural Equation Model (A) 
 
 
Figure 2. Path Diagram -Whole Sample - for Structural Equation Model (B) 
 
The Direct, Indirect and Total Effects 
Table (5) demonstrates direct, and indirect effects among all variables in the Structural Equation Model. It 
includes three panels (A), (B), and (C) respectively.  
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Table 5. Summary of Direct and Indirect Effects of Structural Equation Model 
Direct Effects Indirect Effects 
Model A Model B Model A Model B 
  (1)                (2)  (1)                (2)    (1)                 (2)  (1)              (2) 
Panel A: The Effect of Board Structure on Mutual Fund Performance 
Perf Perf 
CGQ  -0.0020 0.294 -1.0160 0.512 CGQ 
DirOwn  0.0059 0.001 -0.3951 0.782 DirOwn -0.0006 0.000 -0.2937 0.000 
Time  -0.0004 0.000 -0.1542 0.001 Time 
Dump  -0.0001 0.652 0.5075 0.000 Dump 
Dumfc  0.0001 0.779 2.1023 0.000 Dumfc -4.10E-06 0.895 -0.0133 0.460 
FundObj1  0.0008 0.019 -1.1125 0.000 FundObj1 0.0005 0.036 -0.1408 0.434 
FundObj2  -0.0001 0.899 -0.4250 0.224 FundObj2 0.0009 0.006 -0.1753 0.497 
FundObj3  0.0004 0.339 -1.0893 0.002 FundObj3 0.0004 0.091 -0.1564 0.416 
FundObj4  -0.0014 0.001 1.1185 0.002 FundObj4 0.0005 0.064 -0.1659 0.421 
DirTn  0.0000 0.182 -0.0058 0.825 DirTn 0.0000 0.360 0.0176 0.408 
DirFn  0.0000 0.975 -0.0782 0.073 DirFn 0.0001 0.051 -0.0167 0.428 
AudComm  0.0001 0.980 1.1127 0.544 AudComm 0.0016 0.242 -0.9463 0.408 
InvComm  -0.0002 0.878 -0.8483 0.417 InvComm 0.0020 0.001 -0.0765 0.874 
ProfDir  0.0144 0.010 1.9437 0.671 ProfDir -0.0154 0.001 1.1945 0.749 
FinDir  -0.0183 0.020 -2.4791 0.701 FinDir 0.0207 0.001 -2.1181 0.677 
BSize  -0.0003 0.000 0.0669 0.341 BSize 0.0002 0.002 -0.0351 0.576 
IndDir  -0.0049 0.008 0.6582 0.663 IndDir 0.0057 0.001 -0.4552 0.741 
StdDev i 52.5244 0.000 StdDev i 
Panel B: The Effect of Board Structure on Corporate Governance Index 
CGQ CGQ 
DirOwn  0.2890 0.000 0.2890 0.000 DirOwn 
Dumfc  0.0109 0.002 0.0109 0.002 Dumfc 0.0009 0.423 0.0009 0.423 
FundObj1  0.0633 0.000 0.0633 0.000 FundObj1 0.0321 0.000 0.0321 0.000 
FundObj2  0.0495 0.000 0.0495 0.000 FundObj2 0.0525 0.000 0.0525 0.000 
FundObj3  0.0819 0.000 0.0819 0.000 FundObj3 0.0307 0.000 0.0307 0.000 
FundObj4  0.0825 0.000 0.0825 0.000 FundObj4 0.0345 0.000 0.0345 0.000 
DirTn  -0.0114 0.000 -0.0114 0.000 DirTn -0.0025 0.000 -0.0025 0.000 
DirFn  0.0079 0.000 0.0079 0.000 DirFn 0.0036 0.000 0.0036 0.000 
AudComm  0.5766 0.000 0.5766 0.000 AudComm 0.1513 0.000 0.1513 0.000 
InvComm  -0.1399 0.000 -0.1399 0.000 InvComm 0.0917 0.000 0.0917 0.000 
ProfDir  0.6271 0.000 0.6271 0.000 ProfDir -0.7687 0.000 -0.7687 0.000 
FinDir  -0.4345 0.016 -0.4345 0.016 FinDir 1.0742 0.000 1.0742 0.000 
BSize  0.0033 0.099 0.0033 0.099 BSize 0.0133 0.000 0.0133 0.000 
IndDir  -0.2194 0.000 -0.2194 0.000 IndDir 0.2846 0.000 0.2846 0.000 
Panel C: The Effect of Board Structure on Director Ownership 
DirOwn DirOwn 
Dumfc  0.0033 0.421 0.0033 0.421 Dumfc 
FundObj1  0.1110 0.000 0.1110 0.000 FundObj1 
FundObj2 0.1815 0.000 0.1815 0.000 FundObj2 
FundObj3  0.1062 0.000 0.1062 0.000 FundObj3 
FundObj4  0.1192 0.000 0.1192 0.000 FundObj4 
DirTn  -0.0087 0.000 -0.0087 0.000 DirTn 
DirFn 0.0126 0.000 0.0126 0.000 DirFn 
AudComm  0.5234 0.000 0.5234 0.000 AudComm 
InvComm  0.3174 0.000 0.3174 0.000 InvComm 
ProfDir  -2.6595 0.000 -2.6595 0.000 ProfDir 
FinDir  3.7165 0.000 3.7165 0.000 FinDir 
BSize  0.0462 0.000 0.0462 0.000 BSize 
IndDir  0.9846 0.000 0.9846 0.000 IndDir 
Note: This table provides summary of direct, indirect, and total effects from SEM of the effect of board structure 
on stock picking and market timing abilities of the Egyptian mutual fund managers pre and post the financial 
crisis for the sample of 35 funds from (2004-2007) and (2009-2013). 
Panel A: The Effect of Board Structure on Mutual Fund Performance 
Panel (A) demonstrates several significant direct, indirect, and total effects. Firstly, DirOwn, ProfDir, FinDir, 
BSize, and IndDir have significant direct influence on Perf1. Secondly, DirOwn, ProfDir, FinDir, BSize, and 
IndDir have significant indirect influence on Perf1 through the mediating effect of CGQ (DirOwn CGQ 
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Perf1, ProfDir CGQ Perf1, FinDir CGQ Perf1, BSize  CGQ Perf1, and IndDir CGQ Perf1). 
Finally, DirOwn and BSize have significant total influence on Perf1. The Structural Equation Model indicates 
that evaluation of total effects on the determination of Perf1 arise from the combination of direct and indirect 
effects of the variables in the model. 
As indicated previously, all the path coefficients which have significant direct, and significant indirect 
effect on Perf1 have also a significant total effect on Perf1 except three coefficients ProfDir, FinDir, and IndDir. 
Because ProfDir has a positive significant direct effect on Perf1 (0.0144) followed by a negative significant and 
moderate effect by CGQ (-0.0154) which lead to negative insignificant total effect on Perf1 (-0.0010), FinDir has 
a negative significant direct effect on Perf1 (-0.0183) followed by a positive significant and moderate effect by 
CGQ (0.0207) which lead to positive insignificant total effect on Perf1 (0.0024), and IndDir also has a negative 
significant direct effect on Perf1 (-0.0049) followed by a positive significant and moderate effect by CGQ 
(0.0057) which lead to positive insignificant total effect on Perf1 (0.0008). 
Panel B: The Effect of Board Structure on Corporate Governance Index 
Panel (B) demonstrates several significant direct, indirect, and total effects. Firstly, DirOwn, DirTn, DirFn, 
ProfDir, FinDir, AudComm, InvComm, and IndDir have a significant direct influence on CGQ. Secondly, DirTn, 
DirFn, ProfDir, FinDir, AudComm, InvComm, and IndDir have a significant indirect influence on CGQ through 
the mediating effect of DirOwn (ProfDir DirOwn CGQ,                                    
FinDir DirOwn CGQ, DirTn DirOwn CGQ, DirFn DirOwn CGQ, AudComm DirOwn CGQ, 
InvComm DirOwn CGQ, and IndDir DirOwn CGQ). Finally, DirOwn, DirTn, DirFn, AudComm, 
FinDir, and IndDir have a significant total influence on CGQ. The Structural Equation Model indicates that 
evaluation of total effects on the determination of CGQ arises from the combination of direct and indirect effects 
of the variables in the model. 
As indicated previously, all the path coefficients which have significant direct, and significant indirect effect on 
CGQ have also a significant total effect on CGQ, except two coefficients InvComm, and ProfDir. This is 
because InvComm has a negative significant direct effect on CGQ (-0.1399) followed by a positive significant 
and moderate effect by DirOwn (0.0917) which lead to negative insignificant total effect on CGQ (-0.0481), and 
ProfDir has a positive significant direct effect on CGQ (0.6271) followed by a negative significant and moderate 
effect by DirOwn (-0.7687) which lead to negative insignificant total effect on CGQ (-0.1416). 
Panel C: The Effect of Board Structure on Ownership Structure 
Panel (C) demonstrates several significant direct and total effects. Firstly, ProfDir, FinDir, BSize, DirFn, DirTn, 
InvComm, AudComm, and IndDir have a significant direct influence on DirOwn. Finally, ProfDir, FinDir, 
BSize, DirFn, DirTn, InvComm, AudComm, and IndDir have a significant total direct influence on DirOwn. The 
Structural Equation Model indicates that evaluation of total effects on the determination of DirOwn arises from 
the direct effects of the variables in the model only because there are no indirect effects of the variables in this 
model. 
 
4.3 The Goodness of Fit 
The fit indices shown in Table (6) indicate that the hypothesized structural model provides a good fit to the data. 
In this study, the (R-squared) values of the endogenous variables in Table (7) range from 0.46 and 0.96 and the 
overall (R-squared) value is 0.99 for model (A), the (R-squared) values range from 0.33 and 0.96 and the overall 
(R-squared) value is 0.99 for model (B), these values fall within the acceptable range compared with other 
studies in the area of financial management research.  
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Table 6. Structural Equation Model Fit Measure Assessment 
Model A Model B 
Fit Statistics Value Value Description 
Likelihood ratio  
chi2_ms 2.515 4.308 model vs. saturated 
p > chi2 0.642 0.635 
chi2_bs 3661.556 3549.059 baseline vs. saturated 
p > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Population error 
RMSEA 0.000 0.000 Root mean squared error of   approximation 
90% CI, lower 
bound 
0.000 0.000 
upper bound 0.053 0.047 
Pclose 0.936 0.963 Probability RMSEA <= 0.05 
Information 
criteria 
AIC 
 
-
1622.152 
 
1904.665 
Akaike's information criterion 
BIC 
-
1409.077 
2122.001 
Bayesian information criterion 
Baseline 
comparison 
CFI 1.000 1.000 Comparative fit index 
TLI 1.005 1.004 Tucker-Lewis index 
Size of residuals 
SRMR 
0.001 0.001 Standardized root mean squared                                                   
residual 
 CD 0.999 0.999 Coefficient of determination 
           Note: This table provides summary of goodness of fit index. 
 
Table 7. Summary of (R-squared) 
Model A 
Dep vars Fitted 
Variance 
predicted Residual R-squared Mc mc2 
Observed 
Perf1 5.03E-06 2.35E-06 2.68E-06 0.4678 0.6839 0.4678 
CGQ 0.0284 0.0269 0.0014 0.9492 0.9743 0.9492 
DirOwn 0.0554 0.0535 0.0019 0.9658 0.9828 0.9658 
Overall 0.9990 
mc  = correlation between Dep vars and its prediction  
mc2 = mc^2 is the Bentler-Raykov squared multiple correlation coefficient 
 
Model B 
Dep vars fitted 
Variance 
predicted residual R-squared mc mc2 
Observed 
Perf2 2.7270 0.9166 1.8104 0.3361 0.5798 0.3361 
CGQ 0.0284 0.0269 0.0014 0.9492 0.9743 0.9492 
DirOwn 0.0554 0.0535 0.0019 0.9658 0.9828 0.9658 
Overall 0.9988 
mc  = correlation between Dep vars and its prediction   
mc2 = mc^2 is the Bentler-Raykov squared multiple correlation coefficient 
 
5. Conclusion 
Achieving the aim of this study contributes to the finance literature at three levels, theoretical, methodological 
and empirical levels. At the theoretical level, firstly, integrating both the board structure and ownership structure 
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mechanisms contributes to the development of a comprehensive model of mutual fund governance. Unlike 
previous studies (Morck et al., 1988; Klein, 1998; Eisenberg et al., 1998), the theoretical model provides insights 
into the interrelationships between board structure, and ownership structure as fundamental determinants of 
stock picking and market timing of the Egyptian fund managers rather than investigating the effect of each of 
these mechanisms separately on stock picking and market timing of the Egyptian fund managers pre and post 
financial crisis. Secondly, achieving the aim of this study contributes to the finance literature through developing 
a structural equation model of mutual fund governance that addresses the possible interrelationships between 
mutual fund governance and stock picking and market timing of the Egyptian fund managers’ pre and post 
financial crisis, based on integrating perspectives from the agency theory. 
At the methodological level, unlike previous studies that have addressed that the relation between board 
characteristics and firm performance may be spurious because they are endogenously determined and use OLS, 
2SLS, 3SLS to overcome this problem (Erkens et al., 2012; Coles et al., 2008; Bhagat and Black, 2002), this 
study has achieved the broad objective of developing sophisticated statistical techniques, i.e., structural equation 
model (SEM) using STATA MP v.13. SEM allows simultaneous evaluation of the sufficiency of the causal 
model that is proposed to investigate the determinants of mutual fund performance.  
At the empirical level, this study finds that the inspection of the estimated coefficient for the path 
Dumfc Perf2 has the expected positive sign because after the financial crisis period (2009-2013), fund 
managers successfully forecast the market upswing and change the fund beta accordingly, and the fund would be 
performing better than otherwise. Therefore, fund managers can make market timing after the financial crisis 
(Treynor and Mazuy, 1966). Furthermore, this study finds that the inspection of the estimated coefficient for the 
path Dumfc→ CGQ in the two models has the expected positive sign because after the financial crisis period 
(2009-2013), fund managers are skilled in stock picking and market timing. They generate superior performance 
and successfully forecast the market upswing and change the fund beta accordingly, and the fund would be 
performing better than otherwise (Treynor and Mazuy, 1966), and good performance might lead to increasing the 
corporate governance index, and the result is also consistent with the previous result. 
However, the study provides evidence of a negative association between independent directors and 
stock picking of the fund managers measured by Jensen (1968) model during the crisis. The study also provides 
evidence of a negative association between board size and stock picking of the fund managers measured by 
Jensen (1968) model during the crisis. Additionally, the study provides evidence of a negative association 
between equity ownership by directors and stock picking of the fund managers measured by Jensen (1968) 
model during the crisis. These findings are consistent with the previous literature during the crisis period 
(Hillman et al., 2009; Essen et al., 2013; and Erkens et al., 2012). 
Unsurprisingly, the global financial crisis demonstrates the need to integrate behavioral finance into our 
economic and financial theories. The crisis could have been prevented. There would have been no foreclosures 
of homes financed by subprime mortgages if no subprime mortgages were allowed, and no failures of banks 
holding them. Therefore, we should take into consideration aspirations for houses, tradeoffs in crisis prevention 
(Shefrin and Statman, 2011). 
For future research, the model in this study could be expanded to include more factors such as director 
compensation, because there is no data available for complex-level director compensation in the Egyptian mutual 
funds. Thus, this paper suggests that the Egyptian Stock Market should require funds to disclose the total director 
compensation by the complex rather than per fund. The availability of time series data on director compensation 
by the complex leads to higher quality compensation data for research on the relationship between compensation 
and performance.  
This paper conclude that most of the hypothesized relationships are supported (e.g. BSize is negatively 
associated with Perf1, IndDir is negatively associated with Perf1 and CGQ, ProfDir is positively associated with 
Perf1 and CGQ, InvComm is negatively associated with CGQ, DirOwn is positively associated with Perf1 and 
CGQ, DirFn is positively associated with CGQ, and DirTn is negatively associated with DirOwn) and one is not 
supported (e.g. CGQ is not associated with Perf1, and Perf2). Additionally, this paper is consistent with 
(Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin, 2016) that closed end fund board size is negatively related to benchmark-
adjusted returns, because larger boards are less effective in monitoring (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). 
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